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WHAT'S THE NEW LOOK IN SPACE PROCUREMENT? 
Arthur Ahlin 
Director of Contracts 
Martin Mari etta Corporation 
Orlando, Florida 
Summary 
Procurement procedures for today's space 
programs require a new, creative· approach 
somewhat different from the procedures used 
in the procurement of military items . 
In military procurement we are now involved 
in new concepts such as "total package procure -
ment , " "life cycle costing, " and "contract defi -
nition." Some of these new concepts are proving 
to be highly successful, while others are being 
questioned . However , they all share one com-
monality -- a cradle-to-grave sequence. 
In contrast to military procurement, space 
procurement presents a new set of problems 
caused by lack of e xperience , low volume pro -
duction, unknown environments. 
Also, there is a recent trend in the military 
to emphasize post delivery obligation on the 
seller which may prove to be both expensive 
and dangerous . There is a real concern in the 
aerospace industry that this trend in the mili -
tary toward post delivery obligation may even -
tually move into the field of space procurement . 
Imposing post delivery obligations on the 
seller is not the answer and will not provide 
guaranteed performance . The problem is com -
pounded when the product, or end item , is used 
in the space program. 
The best answer to continued high reliability 
and maintainability is i n t he establishment of 
proper acceptance criteria . Once the acceptanc e 
criterion has been firml y established, the risk 
of meeting it is the responsibility of the seller 
and the r i sk of use is carried by the buyer . 
There is a new approach to procurement in 
our nation ' s space and defense programs. New 
policy decisions have been and are being made; 
procurement philosophies are undergoing con -
stant change. These decisions and changes are 
most important to all of us and will have a far -
reaching effect on every firm which does, or 
plans to do, bus i ness with our government. 
These procurement decisions are so impor-
tant that it would be a major error for manage-
ment to neglect its role in making procurement 
decisions . As managers we must accept a 
greater responsibility for the procurement 
process. This, then, is my primary role to-
day - - to urge you to take a good, long look at 
the role of procurement and to get deeply in-
volved in the procurement function . 
There are a lot of catchy phrases and elab-
orate procedures in the Defense Department 
procurement of today. In the Defense Industry 
Bulletin of October 1966, Lt. Col. Jacob B . 
Pompan, U .S . Air Force, covered this new look 
in a very informative and interesting article, 
"An Overview of Air Force Procurement." I 
recommend this article to you, for it is cer-
tainly educational and presents the government's 
interest accurately . Although I do not agree 
completely with all of Lt. Col. Pompan' s views , 
this is to be e xpected since our end objectives 
are different . 
In the interest of more complete planning, 
more practical weapons systems , and lower 
costs , the Department of Defense has attempted 
to resolve a major dilemma. How does the 
government (a single customer) stimul ate and 
control a group of suppliers with no off-the -
shelf products? Further, ho w can the govern-
ment realize the benefits of competition in a 
free enterprise system in acquiring required 
products at sound prices? 
We all hope that these products are techno -
logically the best available , and certainly that 
they are better than those of a potential enemy. 
Bear in mind that there can be a real difference 
between an adequate product and the best product. 
As for me , I belong to the group which says the 
m ilitary must acquire the best . However , we 
are not here today to argue the merits of this 
particular issue. 
Typical in today's lexicon of procurement 
policies at DOD are such phrases as "total 
package procurement," "contract definition," 
and "multiple-year procurement ." I could go 
on and on with other new and similar titles. 
As a matter of fact, one of our more basic 
problems today is that we cannot all agree on 
what these new phrases and catchy titles really 
mean. What we need is a standard glossary 
of terms. 
The buyer - seller dialogue must be grounded 
in complete understanding of the terminology 
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involved so the intent of the buyer and the liabil-
ity of the seller will be free of misinterpretation. 
And among reasonable and conscientious men, 
there can be misinterpretation unless such un-
derstanding is basic and firm. 
The possibility of that became apparent to us 
at the Orlando Division recently when some of 
our engineers began compiling a glossary for 
use in exploring the life cycle costing philosophy. 
They found that no such glossary existed and, 
to compile 213 definitions, had to employ 37 dif-
ferent references. And this was an admittedly 
modest beginning at compiling a list of stand-
ardized definitions. 
My point is this: in weighing government-
industry procurement decisions with multi-
million dollar implications, legal implications, 
and upon which might rest our national prestige, 
there is no room for error caused by misunder-
standing. 
We dare not be the victims of poor communi-
cations. We must mean what we say and feel 
secure in the knowledge that we say what we 
mean. 
Despite the new phrases, good old-fashioned 
competitive fixed-price, advertised bidding is 
still the most effective procurement process - -
so long as the buyer knows precisely what he 
wants and has been buying it for a long time. 
In this environment, the forces of the market 
place are in action, and we can assume that the 
government is getting the most for its money. 
Although some of you may argue effectively 
that negotiations can drive prices lower than 
simple market place competition, let us accept 
this form of procurement as being a reasonable 
method of buying if only because it has been 
with us for so long. Somehow the government 
buys nuts and bolts from the lowest bidder and 
seldom gets criticized. 
At the other end of the procurement policy 
spectrum, very sophisticated schemes are being 
adopted in the hope of producing a simulated 
competition. There is also the hope that only 
the minimum needed requirements will be spec-
ified for a particular weapon system. Two more 
recent innovations are the contract definition 
process and the total procurement package proc-. 
ess. Both are classics and I predict they will 
be with us for some time. 
Ultimate success of these procedures, as 
measured against the original objectives, is yet 
to be demonstrated. We know that the com-
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panies recently and currently involved in these 
types of procurements feel that several ques-
tions remain unanswered. For example, DOD' s 
policy on cost sharing is well stated and really 
says, "Don't cost share." Is this policy being 
followed? Contract definition programs typi-
cally require much more effort than the con-
tracts are funded for. The cost to contractors 
of entering and succeeding in contract definition 
races is extremely high, sometimes two or 
tqree times the amount actually funded by the 
contract. 
Another question deals with technic al inno-
vations. Will the contractor be motivated in the 
contract definition phase or in the acquisition 
phase to discover and implement technical im-
provements which will improve the weapon sys-
tems? We all know that technical di scoveries 
are being made at an accelerating rate. The 
decisions being made today in a contract defi-
nition phase for a weapon to be fielded five 
years from now are guaranteeing us that the 
fielded weapon will be obsolescent. Will we 
take advantage of technical innovations even ·if 
we do find them? Let's hope that our potential 
enemies are operating under the same procure-
ment rules that we are. 
Another question deals with disengagement. 
We've heard that the government will remove 
itself from the contractor's day-to-day operation 
of these programs and will merely observe the 
progress being made. The policy s ounds fine, 
but will it happen? I feel that disengagement i s 
the government's term for saying "We won't be 
held responsible for interfering with your pro-
gram, but we still intend to get as much or more 
paper from you and to require more reports and 
to give you advice as freely as we ever have." 
Sometimes the kibitzer can foul up a friendly 
poker game. 
Let me turn from the procurement experi-
ments in the Department of Defense to the ques-
tion of procurement for space. Unanswered 
technical problems have created a parallel s et 
of procurement problems. At lea st most of the 
military hardware we produce can be expec ted 
to find its final resting place on or in "Mother 
Earth." Space hardware may orbit the planets 
endlessly or be destroyed in the heat of re-entry. 
We have much more to learn about space en-
vironment. Many of our space products will 
never return, and high volume production is 
unlikely. First shot reliability is an absolute 
necessity. 
What makes up the life cycle? Who is the 
customer? Where and when does he accept 
hardware? These are just some of the ques-
tions which must be answered. In an effort to 
solve some of these problems NASA has insti-
tuted the PPP, or Phased Program Planning, 
as a tool for realistic planning of programs . 
This process is a good one and should force 
both buyers and sellers in the space business 
to at least identify some of the right questions 
and develop some answers to them . If these 
plans are implemented, they will be reflected in 
the contracts which form the interface between 
the buyer and the seller. · 
How can we influence this procurement proc-
ess for space items to increase the probability 
that the end item will perform as required? 
Also, how can we do this at the lowest sound 
price? NASA 1 s recent procurement practices 
demonstrate some of the tools which can be 
used . Contract types have r~nged from old 
fashioned CPFF to the new Cost Plus Award 
Fee to multiple incentive to planned interde-
pendency to multiple incentive to firm fixed 
price. 
I know of one contract which calls for a 
penalty-reward system for the end item based 
on the performance of a Lunar drill by an astro-
naut on the surface of the moon . This is a firm 
fixed price contract . How will the contractor 
ever observe that incentive demonstration? 
What if the astronaut doesn't have time to run 
that incentive event? What if the astronaut mis-
uses the end item? What if the astronaut doesn't 
return? 
Many of these procurement practices are 
simply extensions of what the military is ex-
perimenting with and are not necessarily ap-
propriate to space procurement . In some cases, 
the military is learning that the process has 
many problems and should not be used. Please 
understand that these procurement practices 
are not so outrageous as to force me to recom-
mend that my company refuse to accept such 
contracts . Obviously, the customer is always 
right and we are willing to accept business under 
any legal contractual arrangement . I am trying 
to say that the best contractual m ethod for long 
term use are not always an application of what 
DOD is doing. The new look in space procure-
ment must examine different approaches . 
In contrast to the recent growth in space pro-
curement, the military procuring process in 
this country has been in development for about 
200 years. In the last 20 years we have seen 
some radical and significant changes, and for 
the past two years, military procurement has 
certainly been interesting, to say the least. 
On the brighter side , many unknowns with 
respect to military hardware procurement are 
being answered . We are getting answers to 
questions such as : What is the environment 
that the item will be exposed to? How long will 
it be exposed? Who will operate the item? How 
intelligent is he? Who will repair the item? 
Should the item be repaired? 
However, it also appears that the military is 
expecting more and more in the way of post-
delivery obligations on the part of industry. 
These demands are being met in various ways 
by industry, and post-delivery obligations will 
probably become another catchy phrase in the 
military procurement process. In general , in-
dustry' s sense of responsibility for its product 
results in many examples of field repairs or 
replacements which are not necessarily con-
tractual obligations . 
An illustration o f what I mean can be seen in 
the amount of attention the Department of De -
fense has recently given to the concept ~f life 
cycle cost procurement . The application of this 
principle can easily lead to the conclusion that 
life cycle cost is attained when the supplier's 
price has been beat down to a minimum and when 
the supplier has accepted a life time guarantee. 
This is a mistake to think along these lines . 
The purpose of life cycle costing is not to saddle 
the seller with a life time guarantee. The man 
behind the gun in Viet Nam is not concerned with 
whether or not the seller of the gun will replace 
it if it doesn't work. He is concerned only that 
the gun works. 
By imposing post-delivery obligations on the 
seller, customer satisfaction is not automatically 
assured . 
Nevertheless , there is a fear among aero-
space industry leaders that NASA may be lured 
into experimenting with a policy of post-delivery 
obligations . Admittedly, it appears logical that 
having a guarantee on the performance of an item 
after it is delivered certainly motivates the sup-
plier to supply reliable hardware. However, this 
is a tender but deadly trap. 
A typical example of what I am driving at can 
be seen in the consumer market place. The 
common practice in the products we buy every 
day - from washing machines to outboard motors 
is often interpreted as one where the supplier 
has committed himself to post-delivery obliga-
tions. This is not so. Read the warranty care-
fully on your next washing machine, air condi-
tioner, automobile, or fountain pen. 
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In most cases the seller dictates the terms 
unde r which he will honor a warranty, and fre-
quently the decision on whether or not he has a 
responsibility is the seller's decision. The new 
trend in automobile warranties is certainly de-
sirable and leads to very interesting advertising. 
However, the frequency of claims against such 
warranties should impress us to feel that we do 
not care to see the same low degree of reliability 
in a major weapons system and certainly not in 
a space system. In many cases it appears that 
the warranty period is one in which the buyer is 
expected to find all the faults in the car and bring 
it back to the dealer so that the automobile may 
be completed. The well-behaved product with a 
warranty that is never exercised certainly has 
more satisfied customers than the misbehaving 
product with a warranty that is frequently exer-
cised. 
The buyer is entitled to expect trouble-free 
use of the item that he accepts .. Once he does 
accept it the item should perform as specified. 
He should only accept the item if it does perform 
as required. His confidence in trouble-free use 
should depend on demonstrations of such use 
while the item is still the responsibility of the 
seller. If his confidence is grounded only in the 
guarantee, then the buyer as well as the seller 
runs the risk of the item failing to perform t o the 
minimum requirements. 
The seller's risk should be limited to the 
probability that his item is acceptable. The dem-
onstration of such acceptability must be a re-
sponsibility of the seller and must be clearly 
specified as a contractual commitment. In many 
cases the buyer's failure to identify completely 
the entire range of acceptance criteria leads him 
to insist that the sellers' s obligation extend be-
yond the acceptance period. Further, the seller 
must assume liability for unknown performanc e 
criteria which neither party contemplated at the 
beginning of the contract. 
Warranties in situations like this seldom le ad 
to correction of defects, and more likely le ad to 
some form of litigation. The challenge to the 
buyer and user is simple. Specify completely 
what you want to buy. The age of this trite r ule 
merely supports its fundamental truth. Satis-
factory and efficient space procurement mu st be 
based on complete definition. (Here, again, may 
I point out the need for a standard glossary of 
terms.) This definition must include finit e facto r s 
for reliability and maintainability. The procure-
ment process must provide for rigorous demon-
strations that these requirements can be met 
repeatedly. 
The point I am making is simple. The seller 
must demonstrate that his product is satisfactory 
before the buyer accepts it. How can this be done 
for space hardware? For high volume produc-
tion, lot sampling procedures have traditionally 
served this purpose well. For low volume pro-
duction, such as space , what will be the substi-
tute for low sampling? Perhaps lot sampling 
must be applied to low volum e production in some 
way. Perhaps experimental models must be ex-
pended to demonstrate life tests and to demon-
strate maintainability and reliability. Perhaps 
the experimental models will number many 
times more than the so-called production items 
that are eventually accepted. 
We seen to be stuck with the destructive test 
as the only reliable scheme for demonstrating 
reliability. In most cases this is not a practical 
solution, so we must develop more acceptable, 
non-destructive tests. I feel that this is a tre-
mendous challenge to the entire quality control 
profession to spell out acceptance procedures 
which in themselves do not deteriorate the end 
item. 
Pre-delivery demonstrations with high confi-
dence l evels on reliability will certainly cost 
more than we are accustomed to pay. However, 
substituting guarantees and post-delivery obliga-
tion requirements in a contract will not in itself 
improve the confidence that the item will per-
form in its ultimate environment. 
This concept of clear definition of buyer risk 
and user risk is more than a simple defense 
mechanism as stated by a seller. 
I am reminded of those two scoundrels, Abdul 
and Ahmed, who were fearfully awaiting a painful 
execution in some dark dungeon in Arabia many 
years ago . They were guilty of some petty crime 
which called fo r the ultimate penalty. The day 
before certain death, the powerful King issued 
a proclamation : 
"If any of my prisoners can teach my white 
stallion to fly within one month, he shall be a 
free man." 
Ahmed, the pessimist said, "Big deal'· What 
kind of nut i s he? He 1 s only torturing us. I 
won't try such foolishness." 
Abdul, the optimist, immediately volunteered 
to teach th e horse to fly. 
"What can I lose?" he asked. "One, the king 
may feel kindly and pardon all of us during the 
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month. Two, the King may die and the prince 
might pardon us. Three, I might die a nice easy 
death in my sleep during the month, and four, 
who knows, I might even teach that horse to fly!" 
Abdul had no trouble defining his risk. But 
the distinction between buyer risk and seller risk 
is not so simple . 
In procurement of systems an~ equipment to 
be used in space exploration, the buyer owes him-
self and the astronauts who will be using this 
equipment the highest possible degree of confi-
dence that the end item will be used in an environ-
ment that is clearly understood. Most important, 
the item must have repeatedly demonstrated its 
survivability. 
Our major problem is that these requirements 
are not easily identified. Many, many millions 
of dollars will be spent to determine what they 
are. My point is that it is not in the seller's 
charter to assume what these requirements and 
environments are. The seller is in no position 
to guess at the temperature of Venus, the density 
of meteorites, the levels of radiation near Mars. 
It is the responsibility of the seller, however, 
to demonstrate conclusively that all requirements 
set by the buyer have been met. If the seller fails 
to demonstrate compliance he must run the risk 
of nonacceptance . This risk, and consequently 
the risk of no payment, is certainly more moti-
vating than the risk of a part being returned for 
rework. 
I believe that the seller's responsibility should 
be limited to the acceptance of his products, and 
the buyer's responsibility is for the use of the 
product. I realize that some of you may feel that 
this is a "let the buyer beware" attitude. This is 
not the point I am making. If we, as a member 
of the aerospace industry, wish to stay in busi-
ness, we will have a keen interest in product 
responsibility. We have to be prepared to invest-
igate field troubles, to get the equipment back on 
the air, to respond to the user's operational 
needs . 
Where the seller's contributions are outside 
of the contractual responsibilities, he should be 
compensated. But even if he is not compensated, 
I know of no aerospace firm unwilling to make 
every conceivable effort to keep the products 
working. 
In the space age of tomorrow, however, the 
space product supplier will have no opportunity 
to retrieve the failed receiver which is on its 
way to Mars - with or without a warranty. I am 
not advocating less product responsibility. I am 
simply stating that the opportunities for the 
aerospace firm to back up its sense of responsi-
bility will not exist for hardware on its way into 
outer space. 
To summarize the n·ew look in space procure-
ment, these are my key points: 
1 Develop a standard definition of terms so 
that we may all speak and understand the 
same language. 
2 Select only those incentive events which 
are under the control of the seller. Keep 
incentive events simple, and limit them 
only to significant events. 
3 Establish specific and measurable accep-
tance criteria. 
4 The buyer should insist on a reliability 
criterion. If the buyer wants a high confi-
dence reliability demonstration, he should 
be willing to pay for it, and the seller must 
be prepared to demonstrate it. 
5 Keep buyer risk separate from seller risk. 
6 Industry must continue to have and to dem-
onstrate a sense of product responsibility. 
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